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Original Understanding and the Whether, Why, and
How of Judicial Review
For more than one hundred years, legal scholars have endlessly and
heatedly debated whether judicial review of federal legislation was part of the
original understanding of the Constitution. The stakes of the debate are high.
If judicial review was part of the original understanding, then there is a strong
argument that the practice is grounded in the majority’s will, just as the
Founders’ Constitution is. But if it is not—if, as Alexander Bickel1 and others
have claimed, judicial review was a sleight-of-hand creation of Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison2—then judicial review is either countermajoritarian or else must find its popular grounding somewhere other than in
the ratification of the Constitution by “We the People.”
Yet, despite the prominence and the significance of the academic debate
about whether judicial review was part of the original understanding, the
answer to the controversy is surprisingly clear: contrary to the Bickelian point
of view, judicial review was not created in Marbury. While there is a strong
argument that the Constitution’s text contemplates judicial review of federal
legislation—and it seems clear that the Supremacy Clause assumes that the
federal judiciary has the power to review state legislation—the critical evidence
concerning the acceptance of judicial review involves judicial practice. In the
years before Marbury, exercises of judicial review were surprisingly common
and generated surprisingly little controversy in either the courts or the political
arena. As I have written recently, there were thirty-one cases between
ratification and Marbury in which state and federal courts invalidated statutes,
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a number far greater than previously realized.3 Similarly, Maeva Marcus has
shown that, in the first Congresses, Congressmen repeatedly took the position
that the courts would review statutes for constitutionality.4 While acceptance
of judicial review was not universal, it is striking—given the prevalence of the
view that judicial review was created in Marbury—that the power was exercised
so frequently and that the opposition to the exercise of that power was so
limited.
Thus, the difficult questions about the origins of judicial review are not
whether it was part of the original understanding, but why it won such general
acceptance and how the power was to be exercised. Professor Mary Bilder’s
superb article, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review,5 explicitly highlights
these questions and will unquestionably stand as a landmark contribution to
the literature of judicial review because of its contributions to these two areas.
The why debate is one that has perplexed historians; Professor Bilder casts
important new light on the issue by focusing on a body of practice—corporate
law and, more specifically, Privy Council decisions—minimized by other
scholars. The how debate—which, in asking how courts exercised judicial
review, involves exploring the original scope of judicial review—is one that has
more consequence for contemporary commentators because it addresses the
question of when, according to the original understanding, courts should
invalidate statutes. Professor Bilder’s claims with respect to the how question
are perhaps too modest. Her thesis actually has consequences of fundamental
importance because it buttresses a structuralist understanding of judicial
review.
As a matter of British constitutional theory, judicial review was not
established at the time of the American Revolution. While there are a handful
of seventeenth-century cases that some scholars have argued established the
principle of judicial review,6 these cases can also be plausibly read as involving
statutory interpretation and the judicial determination not to enforce
problematic statutes in the absence of clear expressions of legislative purpose.
Even if these cases are best understood as involving exercises of judicial review,
it does not follow that judicial review was accepted at the time of the American
Revolution. These cases preceded both the Glorious Revolution and the rise to
dominance of the Blackstonian view of parliamentary supremacy. Rather than
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reflecting the standard constitutional theory of 1776, they evidence an approach
that had been long abandoned.
If British constitutional theory in 1776 did not embrace judicial review, why
did American courts come to exercise the power, and why did that exercise
generate such little dispute? Professor Bilder argues that the answer lies in
well-established principles of British corporate law. She traces to the thirteenth
century the legal doctrine that corporations—including municipalities, which
were corporate entities—possessed a limited, delegated authority and that
exercises of this authority that exceeded that limited delegation were void.
In the seventeenth century, this doctrine was naturally extended to those
British colonies that possessed corporate charters. Because of similar
circumstances, it was also extended to Crown grants to individual proprietors.
Thus, the Privy Council during the colonial era used the doctrine of
“repugnancy” established in the corporate context to invalidate colonial
statutes and court decisions that were “repugnant” to the laws of England.
Modern analysts readily recognize the theoretical differences between Privy
Council review of colonial legislation for consistency with the imperial legal
regime and the exercise of judicial review of legislative acts for their
constitutionality. Professor Bilder argues, however, that the practice of review
of legislation for repugnancy with a superior body of law was so well
established that, after the American Revolution, courts came to assume almost
reflexively the power that the Privy Council had once exercised.
Professor Bilder thus places at the center of our understanding of the
origins of judicial review imperial practices that I and others previously
thought were of limited significance because of the vast conceptual difference
between Privy Council review and judicial review. In arguing for the relevance
of earlier forms of review, her critical move is to contend that perceived
continuity of practice, rather than logic, led courts to embrace judicial review
and that the same perceived continuity accounts for the absence of popular
challenge to judicial assertions of this power. Judicial review looked like
something Americans were familiar with. Only with the passage of time, as
Americans started to work through the implications of the doctrine of
separation of powers, did challenges to the legitimacy of judicial review
emerge. But late-eighteenth-century Americans failed to grasp the problem.
Because she finds the acceptance of judicial review to be reflexive, rather
than based on a coherent theoretical understanding, Professor Bilder argues
that her history casts little light on the question of when judicial review became
standard practice. She writes, “The simultaneous ambiguity and certainty of
the phrase ‘repugnant to the Constitution’ meant that judges did not initially
have to confront whether they were engaged in what we would call narrow or
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broad constructions of the Constitution. Early cases may—or may not—
support both expansive and restrictive approaches to review.”7
I think Professor Bilder’s conclusion is too modest. Her explanation of the
corporate origins of judicial review dovetails with my recent argument against
the dominant scholarly view—espoused most prominently by Dean Larry
Kramer8—that early exercises of judicial review were limited to statutes that
were clearly unconstitutional. I argue, instead, that the thirty-one cases of
judicial review prior to Marbury reflected a structural approach.
In the pre-Marbury period, federal courts repeatedly invalidated statutes
that affected the judicial role—such as by altering jurisdiction—or the role of
juries, and they did so even when there were plausible constitutional
arguments in favor of the statutes. Similarly, federal courts repeatedly
invalidated state statutes that were arguably constitutional; in most cases, the
invalidated statutes implicated national power. Finally, in two cases, state
courts struck down state statutes for violating the Federal Constitution. These
three categories account for all instances in which the federal courts invalidated
a statute prior to Marbury.
This early American case law reflects a boundary protection approach to
judicial review. Courts in the founding era reviewed legislation that implicated
the powers of those not involved in its adoption: juries, courts, and, in the case
of state legislation, the national government. They did not engage in
meaningful substantive review—rather, they were concerned with protecting
the basic relationships of constitutional governance. Yet, despite the evidence
of this strong pattern throughout a large body of case law, I did not find any
writer from the period who recognized it or provided a theoretical justification
for it.
Professor Bilder’s work does not focus on the nature of the early judicial
review cases in this country and thus she concludes that the early history of
judicial review does not illuminate the question of when judicial review was
exercised. Nonetheless, by placing the early cases in the context of British
corporate law and Privy Council decisions, her article is more important than
she recognizes in illuminating why judicial review was structuralist and why
the advocates of judicial review did not offer a theoretical explanation for their
approach.
Privy Council review was, at its core, concerned with boundaries: the
imperial government’s purpose in conducting such review was to ensure that
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colonial governments did not overstep their bounds. Judicial review in the
early republic involved a similar function: ensuring that legislators did not
legislate in ways that undercut the power of other government entities.
Whereas Professor Bilder finds that the “repugnancy” standard applied by the
courts of this country as they exercised judicial review was so open-ended as to
make the “when” question unanswerable, the historical practice actually fits a
definite pattern analogous to the conception of repugnancy review employed
by the Privy Council.
As I conducted my research, one question I asked myself is why early
writers on judicial review did not explain or justify the structural approach to
judicial review so evident in the case law. Professor Bilder’s approach suggests
an answer: early Americans perceived judicial review by the federal courts as
the application of a pre-existing practice of review for boundary protection in a
new context. They therefore did not apprehend a need to offer an elaborate
justification for a practice to which they were accustomed. In short, Professor
Bilder’s work significantly clarifies why judicial review won such easy
acceptance, and—to an extent that even she fails to appreciate—helps explain
why judicial review was exercised in some cases and not others.
William Michael Treanor is Dean of Fordham Law School. He began his work
on the history of judicial review with The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of
Judicial Review.9 His most recent works include Eldred and Lochner: Copyright
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property (coauthored with Paul Schwartz)10 and Judicial Review Before Marbury,11 a study of
the early American judicial review case law.
Preferred Citation: William Michael Treanor, Original Understanding and
the Whether, Why, and How of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 218
(2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/09/treanor.html.

9.

10.

11.

222

William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 491 (1994).
Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331 (2003).
Treanor, supra note 3.

